Abstract. The forthcoming NIST's Advanced Hash Standard (AHS) competition to select SHA-3 hash function requires that each candidate hash function submission must have at least one construction to support FIPS 198 HMAC application. As part of its evaluation, NIST is aiming to select either a candidate hash function which is more resistant to known side channel attacks (SCA) when plugged into HMAC, or that has an alternative MAC mode which is more resistant to known SCA than the other submitted alternatives. In response to this, we perform differential power analysis (DPA) on the possible smart card implementations of some of the recently proposed MAC alternatives to NMAC (a fully analyzed variant of HMAC) and HMAC algorithms and NMAC/HMAC versions of some recently proposed hash and compression function modes. We show that the recently proposed BNMAC and KMDP MAC schemes are even weaker than NMAC/HMAC against the DPA attacks, whereas multi-lane NMAC, EMD MAC and the keyed wide-pipe hash have similar security to NMAC against the DPA attacks. Our DPA attacks do not work on the NMAC setting of MDC-2, Grindahl and MAME compression functions.
Introduction
The cryptanalysis of the MD5 and SHA-1 hash functions [41, 42] and its impact on several applications [5, 10, 13, 16, 40] have triggered a kind of feeding frenzy among the cryptographers. On the other hand, generic attacks [20, 23] on the popular Merkle-Damgård (MD) hash framework [12, 30] have exposed several of its undesirable properties.
In the wake of this active cryptanalysis of hash functions and its impact on applications, NIST is conducting an international competition to define an Advanced Hash Standard (AHS) which would be referred to as SHA-3 family [34] . NIST requires that each candidate hash function must have at least one construction to support the current applications of hash functions specified in the FIPS or NIST special publications that include FIPS 198 HMAC [33] . As part of its evaluation, NIST is also considering side channel attacks (SCA) on the hash based MACs. NIST intends to select as SHA-3, either a candidate hash which is more resistant to known SCA attacks when plugged into HMAC, or that has an alternative MAC mode which is more resistant to known SCA attacks than the other submitted alternatives [9, 21, 22] .
Considering this state of the art of research in hash functions, we believe that AHS competition would receive hash as well as compression function modes as candidates for SHA-3 using structures and chaining modes different from the ones used in the broken hash functions. It is prominent that such proposals define provably secure MAC modes with a protection from the SCA attacks.
This research problem has motivated us to assess the security of several recently proposed MAC alternatives to NMAC (a thoroughly analysed variant of HMAC) and HMAC algorithms [3, 2] and some compression function and hash function modes in the NMAC/HMAC setting from differential power analysis (DPA) attacks. We analyse MACs that are assumed to be instantiated with the compression functions built over ideal block ciphers that are secure against SCA attacks as was done in [36, 17] . If the proposed MAC or hash function mode does not specify any block cipher based compression function then we analyse it using twelve secure compression functions based on block ciphers proposed by Preneel, Govaerts and Vandewalle (PGV) [38] . Such analysis allows the designers to construct hash and DPA resistant MAC modes whose security can be formally reduced to the compression function modes that are real and whose security was formally established [7] . In a related work, HMAC based on the dedicated hash functions SHA-1 and SHA-256 was shown to be vulnerable to the side channel attacks [28, 26] .
Our Approach
We analyse several recently proposed provably secure MAC alternatives to the NMAC/HMAC algorithms and NMAC/HMAC settings of some compression function and hash function prototypes proposed in the literature against the DPA attacks. Although the list of MAC algorithms that we have analysed may not be thorough, our analysis can be easily extended to the other similar MAC proposals that we might have missed. The outcome of the DPA attacks on many of these MAC schemes is the recovery of their secret keys. The MAC schemes that are vulnerable to the complete key recovery attacks can be universally forged ; forgery for any given message. The MACs for which we can partially recover the key or internal state, we can either existentially forge the scheme by computing a valid authentication tag for a random message or cannot guarantee its security against forgery attacks. We perform DPA analysis of MACs by dividing them into Type-1 and Type-2 categories:
Type-1: Provably secure MAC alternatives to NMAC/HMAC. These MAC schemes, in general, are based on the alternative hash frameworks to the
